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Notes	towards	a	surfacing	of	feminist	theoretical	turns	
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Abstract	This	article	suggests	that	feminist	theoretical	turns	are	illuminating	to	study,	as	they	make	explicit	how	Western	feminist	theory	is	interested	not	only	in	the	content	of	different	theoretical	turns,	but	also,	relatedly,	in	how	these	turns	move	feminist	theory	in	particular	directions.	Exploring	some	of	the	current	and	historical	debate	about	turns	in	feminist	theory,	I	pay	particular	attention	to	how	these	debates	might	be	understood	in	terms	of	a	wide	range	of	work	on	the	non-linear	temporalities	of	feminist	theory.	I	suggest	that	one	way	to	understand	the	non-linear	temporalities	evident	in	debates	over	feminist	theoretical	turns	is	through	a	‘turn	to	the	surface’.	To	explicate	this	suggestion,	I	offer	a	series	of	five	indicative	issues,	terms	and	ideas,	which	emerge	both	from	recent	work	on	the	surface	and	feminist	theory,	and	from	my	attempts	to	think	conceptually	about	turns,	surfaces,	and	the	relations	between	them.	These	are:	(i)	reflexivity;	(ii)	
possibility;	(iii)	lines;	(iv)	knots;	and	(v)	diagrams.	I	conclude	by	raising	a	number	of	further	points	that	emerge	through	an	attempt	to	engage	in	the	surfacing	of	feminist	theory.		
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	 2	
Bio	Rebecca	Coleman	is	Senior	Lecturer	in	the	Sociology	Department,	Goldsmiths,	University	of	London.	Her	research	and	teaching	focuses	on	sensory	sociology	and	affect,	bodies,	temporality	(especially	futures	and	presents),	surfaces,	and	inventive	methodologies.	She	has	published	widely	in	these	areas	and	is	currently	developing	interdisciplinary	projects	that	cut	across	them.		 	
	 3	
A	good	deal	of	discussion	is	currently	being	had	on	the	turns	to	affect	and	the	new	materialism(s)	in	Western	feminist	theory.	Such	discussion	is	not	new;	the	cultural,	linguistic	and	postmodern	turns	in	feminist	theory	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	also	generated	similar	debate.	In	questioning	what	and	who	is	included	and	excluded	in	these	theoretical	shifts,	the	discussion	demonstrates	how	attention	to	issues	of	access,	omission	and	marginalization	is	vital	to	feminist	theory,	and	more	widely	has	been	crucial	in	pointing	out	and	intervening	in	normative	power	relations	and	knowledge	production.	It	also	demonstrates	the	significance	of	the	development,	advancement	or	trajectory	of	feminist	theory	to	feminist	theory.	That	is,	feminist	theory	is	interested	not	only	in	the	content	of	different	theoretical	turns,	but	also,	relatedly,	in	how	these	turns	
orient	feminist	theory	in	particular	directions.	There	is	debate,	then,	over	what	is	at	stake	in	a	theoretical	turn,	how	it	comes	to	be	of	concern	at	a	particular	moment,	and	how	certain	matters	of	interest	come	to	move	feminist	theory.	Turns	thus	illuminate	(struggle	over)	the	content	and	movements	of	feminist	theory;	and	they	are	also	a	particularly	illuminating	focus	of	study	in	themselves,	as	the	debate	around	and	about	them	make	explicit	feminist	theoretical	movements	and	trajectories.		While	recognising	that	the	content	and	trajectories	of	feminist	theory	cannot	be	fully	separated,	my	aim	in	this	article	is	to	concentrate	on	the	movements	and	trajectories	of	feminist	theoretical	turns.	I	address	three	main	questions:	How	might	feminist	theory	be	
understood	in	terms	of	a	surface?	What	might	a	conception	of	the	surface	have	to	offer	
understandings	of	the	trajectories	and	movements	of	feminist	theory?	And,	more	
specifically,	how	might	conceiving	feminist	theory	in	terms	of	a	surface	account	for	the	
ways	in	which	the	temporalities	of	feminist	theory	are	understood	in	ongoing	debates	
about	theoretical	turns?	As	these	questions	indicate,	while	I	discuss	some	of	the	debates	that	arise	about	specific	turns,	my	aim	is	to	focus	on	turns	more	abstractly,	in	order	to	think	about	the	temporal	work	that	they	are	understood	to	do1.	In	focusing	on	
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temporality,	I	am	drawing	on	a	wide	range	of	feminist	work	on	narratives	and	stories	(Hemmings	2011),	generation	(van	der	Tuin	2009,	2015,	McRobbie	2008),	the	(non-)reproduction	and	‘passing	on’	of	feminism	(Roof	1997,	Adkins	2004,	Skeggs	2008),	as	well	as	on	feminist	hope	(Spivak	2002,	Coleman	and	Ferreday	2011),	optimism	(Berlant	2011),	futurity	(Grosz	1999,	2000,	Coleman	2009),	and	transformation	(Ahmed	et	al	2000).	Much	of	this	work	challenges	the	notion	of	linear	temporality	as	an	adequate	means	through	which	to	understand	feminist	theory,	arguing	that	feminist	theory	moves	not	so	much	through	‘continuous	growth,	smooth	unfolding,	or	accretion’	(Grosz	1999:	28),	but	rather	through	struggle,	attrition,	division	and	difference	(Grosz	1999,	Skeggs	2008,	Spivak	2002),	reflexivity	(Adkins	2004),	diffraction	(Barad	2007,	Haraway	1997,	van	der	Tuin	2011),	re-turns	(Hemmings	2011,	Hughes	and	Lury	2013),	or	intensive	time	(Coleman	2014).	I	draw	on	this	work	to	explore	the	temporalities	of	feminist	theoretical	turns.		To	do	this,	I	take	up	what	is	called	a	‘turn	to	the	surface’	in	recent	cultural	and	social	theory	(Adkins	and	Lury	2009,	Forsyth	et	al	2013,	Coleman	and	Oakley-Brown,	in	preparation).	Noting	that	this	emerging	area	of	interdisciplinary	research	is	itself	proposed	as	a	‘turn’,	I	explore	how	the	surface	is	understood	as	‘a	space	[and	time]	of	possible	states’	(Adkins	and	Lury	2009:	18);	a	site	that	is	‘open,	processual,	non-linear	and	constantly	on	the	move’	(Adkins	and	Lury	2009:	18).	I	suggest	that	feminist	turns	might	be	understood	in	terms	of	such	a	surface.	In	order	to	explicate	this	suggestion,	I	offer	a	series	of	five	indicative	issues,	terms	and	ideas,	which	emerge	both	from	recent	work	on	the	surface	and	some	of	the	feminist	theory	introduced	above,	and	from	my	attempts	to	think	conceptually	about	turns,	surfaces,	and	the	relations	between	them.	These	are:	(i)	reflexivity;	(ii)	possibility;	(iii)	lines;	(iv)	knots;	and	(v)	diagrams.	I	conclude	by	raising	a	number	of	further	points	that	emerge	through	an	attempt	to	engage	in	the	surfacing	of	feminist	theory.	
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Debating	feminist	theoretical	turns		In	contemporary	feminist,	social	and	cultural	theory,	it	is	perhaps	the	affective	and	new	materialist	turns	that	are	most	prominent,	and	hence	currently	generating	most	debate.	Both	of	these	turns	are	interdisciplinary,	drawing	scholars,	theories,	concepts,	and	examples	from	across	the	social	sciences,	humanities,	arts	and	sciences.2	Given	these	different	traditions	of	work	on	and	positions	from	which	to	approach	affect	and	the	new	materialisms,	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	terms	of	the	turns	are	under	debate.	For	example,	in	the	affective	turn,	some	of	these	debates	focus	on	the	veracity,	effectiveness	and	appropriateness	of	applying	concepts	developed	in	one	discipline	or	domain	to	another	(see	Leys	2011,	Papoulias	and	Callard	2010,	Wetherell	2012,	2015).	Other	debates	attend	to	how	theorists	are	positioned	in	relation	to	the	turn.	Clare	Hemmings	(2005)	has	argued	that	while	both	Eve	Kofosky	Sedgwick	(1995,	2003)	and	Brian	Massumi	(1995,	2002)	–	two	central	theorists	of	affect	who	come	from	different	traditions	and	have	been	influential	to	feminist	and	queer	theory	–	note	that	affect	is	inherently	neither	good	nor	bad,	they	nevertheless	focus	on	‘the	good	affect	that	undoes	the	bad’	(2005:	551).	The	effect,	Hemmings	contends,	is	for	affect	theory	to	‘often	emerge…	as	a	rhetorical	device	whose	ultimate	goal	is	to	persuade	“paranoid	theorists”	into	a	more	productive	frame	of	mind’	(2005:	551);	that	is,	feminist	theory	is	encouraged	to	be	affirmative	rather	than	negative.	This	approach	risks	ignoring	what	Sianne	Ngai	(2005)	calls	‘ugly	feelings’,	which	in	her	analysis	of	film	and	literature	she	argues	are	more	readily	associated	with	people	of	colour;	as	Saidiya	V.	Hartman	argues	‘[a]ffect,	gesture,	and	a	vulnerability	to	violence’	has	historically	‘constituted	blackness’	(1997:	26).	As	such,	for	many	who	express	concern	over	the	affective	turn,	those	who	are	positioned	as	(focusing	on	the)	‘negative’	are	at	once	also	positioned	as	‘belong[ing]	to	the	past,	to	the	already	dealt	with’	(Hemmings	2005:	561).	It	is	notable	that	those	
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positioned	as	‘past’	are	very	often	those	concerned	with	‘old’	categories	of	race,	gender,	class	–	and	indeed,	as	I	discuss	below,	with	structural	problems	such	as	patriarchy.		Similar	debates	are	present	in	arguments	for	and	assessments	of	the	‘new	materialist	turn’,	which,	while	distinct,	in	many	ways	intersects	with	the	affective	turn	in	its	interest	in	materiality,	process	and	the	entanglement	of	nature	and	culture.	Picking	up	on	the	ways	this	debate	engages	with	the	movement	and	development	of	feminist	theory,	it	is	notable	that	the	‘new’	in	new	materialisms	is	often	identified	as	of	particular	concern.	Sara	Ahmed,	for	example,	argues	that	in	proposing	a	new	materialist	approach	as	novel,	advocates	tend	to	present	‘a	false	and	reductive	history	of	feminist	engagement	with	biology,	science	and	materialism’	(2008:	24).	Feminism	has	long	examined,	interrogated	and	critiqued	biology	and	science,	and	thus	‘we	need	to	appreciate	the	feminist	work	that	comes	before	us,	in	all	its	complexity’	(2008:	36).	As	Peta	Hinton	and	Xin	Liu	(2015)	put	it,	Ahmed’s	argument	is	that	the	new	materialism	is	a,			 body	of	thought	that	contains	a	progress	narrative	that	aims	to	move	beyond	past	feminist	failings,	a	gesture	that	enables	its	self-promotion	as	a	novel	brand	and	generation	of	(feminist)	intervention	wedded	to	a	particular	vision	of	matter’s	transformative	potential	(2015:	128)	3.			I	will	return	to	the	issues	of	progress	and	how	feminist	theory	may	account	for	both	endorsements	and	critiques	of	particular	turns	below.	Here,	I	want	to	note	that	struggles	over	turns	in	feminist	theory	are	not	confined	to	affect	and	the	new	materialisms.	Discussing	the	linguistic	turn,	Kathleen	Canning	(1994)	argues	that,	although	often	overlooked,	feminist	history	had	as	important	a	role	as	the	work	of	Foucault,	Derrida	and	Lacan	(1994:	370)	in	‘[t]he	decentering	of	the	Western	white	male	subject	and	the	reformulation	of	subjectivity	as	a	site	of	unity	and	conflict’	(1994:	371).	Similarly,	from	a	
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feminist	perspective,	Frances	E.	Mascia-Lees,	Patricia	Sharpe	and	Colleen	Ballerino	Cohen	(1989)	caution	against	the	postmodernist	turn	in	anthropology,	arguing	that:		 what	appear	to	be	new	and	exciting	insights	to	those	new	postmodernist	anthropologists	–	that	culture	is	composed	of	seriously	contested	codes	of	meaning,	that	language	and	politics	are	inseparable,	and	that	constructing	the	“other”	entails	relations	of	domination	–	are	insights	that	have	received	repeated	and	rich	exploration	in	feminist	theory	for	the	past	forty	years	(1989:	11).			In	ways	that	resonate	with	Ahmed’s	argument,	then,	both	Canning	and	Mascia-Lees	et	al	seek	to	re-assert	the	significance	of	previous	and	seemingly	disregarded	feminist	work	in	establishing	a	theoretical	turn,	or	in	already	inquiring	into	the	issues	that	come	to	be	posed	as	‘new	and	exciting’	in	a	turn4.	Furthermore,	what	can	also	be	discerned	in	their	arguments	are	connections	between	what	is	posited	as	‘new’	and	‘old’,	what	is	overlooked	or	sidelined	within	a	turn,	and	what	makes	a	turn	‘controversial’	(1994:	370)	and	‘uneasy’	(1994:	369)	from	a	feminist	perspective.5			
The	temporalities	of	feminist	turns		Debates	about	what	is	‘new’	and	‘old’	in	a	theoretical	turn	can	be	helpfully	understood	in	terms	of	how	the	temporalities	of	feminist	theory	more	widely	are	comprehended	and	presented	within	feminist	work.	Indeed,	the	‘new’	and	‘old’	might	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	three	structures	that	Hemmings	(2011)	argues	dominate	what	and	how	stories	about	Western	feminist	theory	are	told.	These	stories	–	which	operate	according	to	narratives	of	progress,	loss	and	return	–	conceive	the	‘new’	and	‘old’	differently,	in	part	through	how	feminist	theoretical	work	is	understood	in	relation	to	the	past,	present	and	future.	Briefly	put,	progress	and	loss	narratives	work	through	a	similar	chronological	temporality	but	disagree	on	how	to	understand	and	relate	to	the	past	and	
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present.	In	progress	narratives,	the	past	is	‘temporally	secured’	in	terms	of	sameness,	singularity	and	simplicity	in	contrast	to	the	present	as	difference,	multiplicity	and	complexity	(2011:	36).	This	trajectory	operates	through	an	‘emphasis	on	newness,	transformation,	and	proliferation;	the	present	is	an	exciting	time	of	possibility,	and	we	are	invited	to	explore	this	“new	conceptual	terrain”	with	appropriate	attitude’	(2011:	56)6.	Loss	narratives	maintain	the	same	approach	to	the	chronology	of	the	past	and	present	(2011:	61),	but	seek	to	demonstrate	that	feminist	theory	has	always	attended	to	difference,	multiplicity,	and	has	always	been	complex	–	and	in	fact	was	better	(equipped,	oriented,	organised)	in	the	past.			The	third	story	Hemmings	identifies	offers	to	reconcile	the	feminist	subjects	of	progress	and	loss	narratives	through	a	return	to	what	is	framed	as	an	issue	in	the	past	that	‘we’	or	‘they’	can	all	agree	is	important	and	in	need	of	revisiting:	materialism.	Interestingly	for	my	focus	here,	Hemmings	explains	this	narrative	with	reference	to	the	cultural	turn.	Prevalent	largely	from	the	2000s	onwards	(2011:	99),	the	return	narrative	indicates	that	materialism	may	either	refer	to	a	return	to	social	reality	–	namely	social	inequality	–	or	to	science,	biology	and	the	non-human,	as	with	the	new	materialisms;	both	areas	of	inquiry	that	proponents	of	the	return	narrative	argue	have	been	(differently)	occluded	by	the	‘textual	play’	of	the	cultural	turn.	In	either	case,	Hemmings	argues	that	the	‘return	narrative	is	predicted	on,	indeed	enacts,	a	temporality	in	which	the	cultural	turn	is,	or	must	be,	left	behind’	(2011:	104);	the	cultural	turn	is	over,	and	‘[w]ounded	but	brave	feminist	materialists	of	both	kinds	can	thus	emerge	triumphant	to	greet	the	new	dawn’	(2011:	109).		Hemmings	highlights	the	importance	of	chronology	in	each	of	these	structures	of	Western	feminist	storytelling.	In	some	ways,	these	three	distinct	modes	of	storytelling	assume	and	work	via	a	linear	temporality,	in	that	while	they	all	have	different	
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relationships	to	the	past,	present	and	future	of	feminist	theory,	the	past,	present	and	future	nevertheless	are	seen	to	unfold	into	each	other.	Indeed,	Hemmings	explicates	these	three	stories	through	the	ways	different	theoretical	concerns	and	styles	are	attributed	to	specific	decades,	which	follow	on	from	each	other,	albeit	not	necessarily	in	a	smooth	manner	(2011:	5).	However,	these	three	stories	may	also	be	understood	as	demonstrating	how	the	temporality	of	feminist	theory	is	not	linear,	or	straightforward.	While	a	non-linear	temporality	might	be	most	immediately	clear	in	the	stories	of	loss	and	return	–	in	that	as	stories	they	highlight,	differently,	the	salience	of	‘the	past’	of	feminist	theory	and	hence	require	identification	with	or	return	to	a	temporality	that	is	not	present	–	it	is	also	evident	in	the	progress	narrative.	The	progress	story	appears	to	work	chronologically;	but	it	also	indicates	a	potential	disruption	to	a	temporality	that	advances	linearly	from	the	past	to	present	to	future.	Hemmings	argues	that	the	‘shifts	in	time	and	approach’	of	the	progress	story	‘transform	rather	than	merely	adds	to	existing	approaches,	deconstructs	and	moves	beyond	as	well	as	forward’	(2011:	35).	In	transforming,	deconstructing	and	moving	beyond	existing	approaches,	the	progress	narrative	therefore	does	not	(only)	involve	a	smooth	evolution:	what	the	‘new’,	‘old’,	past,	present	and	future	are,	and	how	they	are	understood,	are	not	in	stable	relations	to	each	other,	to	theoretical	turns,	or	to	feminist	theorists.		Such	an	understanding	of	the	non-linearity	of	the	development	of	feminist	theory	may	be	identified	in	other	engagements	with	and	critiques	of	feminist	progress.	For	example,	arguments	that	feminism	has	been	so	successful	that	it	is	now	‘repudiated’	and	cast	as	no	longer	needed	(McRobbie	2008),	point	to	a	need	to	revive	feminist	theory	and/or	to	maintain	an	attention	to	how	it	is	still	needed.	Feminist	theory	is,	then,	at	the	same	time,	‘over’,	ongoing,	and	in	need	of	refreshing.	Analysing	some	of	these	temporalities	of	feminist	theory,	Lisa	Adkins	(2004)	argues	that	feminist	theory	is	often	seen	to	work	via	a	logic	of	reproduction	across	generations,	and	identifies	concern	with	how	this	
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reproduction	has	failed,	with	younger	women	seen	as	‘refusing	to	inherit	their	feminist	legacies’	(2004:	430).	She	argues	that	this	notion	of	failure	relies	‘on	reproductive	narratives	whereby	a	linear	chronological	time	is	assumed’	(2004:	428);	‘because	the	present	and	the	future	are	not	being	shaped	by	the	past,	feminism	must	(and	can	only)	be	declared	as	passed	away’	(2004:	429).	Here,	then,	young	women	are	positioned	as	‘the	new’	in	a	problematic	way.			However,	Adkins	takes	up	questions	posed	by	Judith	Roof:		 What	if	we	perceived	time	not	as	linear	or	[…]	generational	but	as	multidirectional?	What	if	we	understand	narrative	as	repetition,	alternation,	oscillation	[…]?	What	if	cause	and	effect	can	go	both	ways?	What	if	action	and	thought	are	a	gift	that	expect	no	return	and	create	no	debt?	(Roof	1997:	87,	cited	in	Adkins	2004:	431).		Adkins’	response	to	these	questions	is	to	see	feminism	as	in	a	reflexive	relationship	with	both	the	social	and	epistemological.	That	is,	feminism	is	in	a	dynamic	and	changing	relationship	with	the	social	world,	which	it	examines	and	intervenes	in,	and	the	theoretical	frameworks	through	which	its	arguments	are	produced	and	contextualized	(2004:	434).	As	such,	feminism	is	also	in	a	reflexive	relationship	with	time;	temporality	is	itself	reflexive	and	multidirectional	rather	than	linear.	According	to	this	approach,	it	is	only	possible	to	suggest	that	feminism	has	passed,	and	that	young	women	–	as	‘the	new’	–	have	failed	feminism,	if	feminism	is	understood	to	operate	according	to	a	linear	chronology.		
Turns	and	surfaces,	surfacing	turns		
	 11	
The	purposes	of	the	previous	sections	were	to	establish,	first,	that	debate	over	feminist	turns	is	ongoing	and	concerns	not	only	the	content	of	the	turn	but	also	the	direction	in	which	the	turn	is	seen	as	taking	feminist	theory,	and	second,	that	in	examining	and	telling	the	stories	of	the	trajectories	of	feminist	theory,	feminist	theory	has	pointed	to	the	importance	of	understanding	feminism	in	terms	of	non-linear	temporality.	In	discussing	these	various	positions,	then,	what	becomes	clear	is	that	there	has	been	and	there	remains	struggle	within	feminist	theory	over	what	feminist	theory	‘is’,	‘was’,	might	or	should	be.	Such	struggle	is	amplified	in	and	through	debates	about	theoretical	turns,	as	turns	highlight	moments	at	which	feminist	theory	is	moving	in	particular	directions,	for	good	or	for	ill.	It	is	on	these	points	about	the	movement	and	diversity	of	feminist	theory	–	intensified	in	debate	about	feminist	turns	–	that	I	suggest	that	a	conception	of	the	surface	might	be	helpfully	introduced.		As	indicated	above,	within	social	and	cultural	theory	the	surface	is	currently	being	proposed	as	a	means	to	understand	process	and	open-endedness,	non-linearity	and	mobilities7.	Such	work	challenges	how	the	surface	has	conventionally	been	opposed	to,	and	seen	as	superficial	in	relation	to,	depth	(for	example	in	some	critiques	of	postmodernism;	Jameson	1984),	and	has	posited	the	surface	as	ontological.	For	example,	Isla	Forsyth,	Hayden	Lorimer,	Peter	Merriman	and	James	Robinson	argue	that	focusing	on	the	surface	‘trouble[s]	the	ontological	principle	that	would	have	surfaces	as	primarily	constitutive	of	external	forms	and	bounded	states’	(2013:	1018),	and	ask	about	the	‘ontological	status	surfaces	are	afforded’	(2013:	1013).	Adkins	and	Celia	Lury	suggest	that	in	order	to	understand	a	changing	social	world,	there	is,			 a	need	to	redefine	the	relations	between	ontology	and	epistemology,	and	in	particular	a	problematisation	of	surface-depth	models	that	is	articulated	in	historical	understandings	of	representation	in	relation	to,	for	example,	
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hermeneutics,	translation,	concept	formation,	involvement	of	publics,	and	so	on	(2009:	15).			In	particular,	they	point	out	how	the	social	is	(in)	a	state	of	becoming	(it	is	‘open,	processual,	non-linear,	and	on	the	move’)	and	that	the	arrangement	and	co-ordination	of	this	new	social			 does	not	take	place	in	relation	to	an	externally	fixed	space,	that	is	a	space	in	which	epistemology	is	‘above’,	‘behind’	or	‘beyond’	ontology,	but	in	relation	to	a	surface	in	which	the	co-ordinating	axes	or	categories	of	knowing	are	implanted,	producing	a	space	of	possible	states	(2009:	18).		For	Adkins	and	Lury	and	Forsyth	et	al,	the	surface	becomes	a	means	of	understanding	the	social,	spatial	and	temporal8,	and	how	a	‘space	of	possible	states’	is	coordinated.	It	is	in	these	two	ways	that	I	think	the	surface	might	be	helpful	for	exploring	feminist	theoretical	turns.	I	want	to	suggest	that	a	turn	be	understood	in	terms	of	a	surface;	or,	put	slightly	differently,	that	a	turn	be	surfaced.		If	turns	are	approached	conceptually,	they	might	be	understood	as	the	evolution	or	progression	of	feminist	theory.	Like	the	perhaps	more	familiar	trope	of	feminist	waves,	turns	might	be	thought	of	as	indicating	flow	and	evolution	(the	first	wave	rolling	into	the	second	wave,	for	example;	the	cultural	turn	flowing	into	the	affective	or	new	materialist	turn).	However,	while	waves	certainly	signal	a	change	of	focus	and	generate	contestation	and	struggle,	as	I	have	discussed,	for	critics	in	particular,	turns	seem	to	suggest	a	rupture	or	break	in	the	content	and	trajectory	of	feminist	theory;	a	turning	away	from	or	making	past	of	certain	things	(histories,	issues,	politics,	subjects)	in	the	turn	towards	other	things.	Indeed,	in	general	dictionary	definitions,	turns	are	explained	
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as	a	change	of	direction,	the	following	of	a	different	course,	or	the	altering	of	focus.9	However,	I	want	to	suggest	that	in	surfacing	a	turn,	it	is	possible	to	understand	that	turn	not	so	much	as	a	break	or	rupture	but	rather,	in	Adkins	and	Lury’s	terms,	as	a	site	of	‘possible	states’.			There	are	two	reasons	for	this	surfacing	of	a	turn.	One	is	to	attempt	to	take	seriously	both	endorsements	and	critiques	of	theoretical	turns	–	that	is,	to	attend	to	debates	about	theoretical	turns.	As	I	have	suggested,	debate	and	struggle	is	crucial	to	the	politics	and	ethics	of	feminist	theory.	If	an	aim	of	feminist	theory	is	not	to	dampen	debate	but	to	take	it	(it	itself	and	the	points	it	raises)	seriously,	in	what	spirit	might	the	difference	indicated	in	debates	about	feminist	turns	be	approached	and	conceived?	Drawing	through	Adkins	and	Lury’s	conception	of	the	surface	as	a	site	of	‘possible	states’,	what	would	be	involved	in	seeing	debates	about	a	feminist	theoretical	turn	as	an	indication	of	the	possible	states	of	feminist	theory?	How	might	debates	about	a	turn	occupy	one	surface?	The	second	reason	for	suggesting	a	surfacing	of	feminist	theoretical	turns	is	to	take	seriously	the	non-linearity	of	feminist	theory.	If	neither	evolution	nor	rupture	is	an	appropriate	means	of	understanding	the	movement	and	development	of	feminist	theory,	how	might	the	surface	be	able	to	account	for	the	temporalities	of	feminist	theory	that	are	in	Roof’s	terms,	‘multidirectional’	and	involve	‘repetition,	alternation,	oscillation’?	How	might	the	various	pasts,	presents	and	futures	imagined	for	feminist	theory	that	are	highlighted	in	debates	about	turns	be	understood,	mapped	and	co-ordinated?		To	address	these	questions	and	explore	the	potential	utility	of	the	surface	for	conceiving	feminist	theory,	and	feminist	turns	more	specifically,	the	rest	of	the	article	is	organised	around	a	series	of	five	indicative	issues,	terms	and	ideas	that	have	begun	to	emerge	in	the	discussion	so	far:	(i)	reflexivity,	or,	a	reformulation	of	the	relationship	between	
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ontology	and	epistemology;	(ii)	possibility,	or	the	non-linear	trajectories	of	feminist	theory;	(iii)	lines,	or	accounting	for	the	non-linear	trajectories	of	feminist	theory;	(iv)	
knots,	or	the	tying	together	of	non-linear	trajectories	in	feminist	theory,	and	accounting	for	what	of	a	theoretical	turn	is	seen	as	particularly	important;	and	(iv)	diagrams,	or	accounting	for	the	coordination	of	a	surface.	While	these	sections	inter-relate	(or,	better,	in	Karen	Barad’s	(2007)	terms,	intra-act),	they	do	not	necessarily	develop	smoothly	on	from	each	other.	Rather,	following	through	the	conception	of	temporality	developed	so	far,	they	connect	in	ways	that	are	multidirectional,	and	they	take	off	from,	repeat	(with	difference)	and	oscillate	between	each	other.		
Reflexivity,	or	a	reformulation	of	the	relationship	between	ontology	and	
epistemology	One	of	the	characteristics	of	the	turn	to	the	surface	that	Adkins	and	Lury	describe	is	a	reconfiguring	of	the	relationship	between	epistemology	and	ontology.	For	Adkins	and	Lury,	in	order	to	understand	open-endedness,	process,	non-linearity	and	movement	or	mobility,	it	is	necessary	to	both	see	that,	and	to	develop	an,	epistemology	(that)	is	not	‘“above”,	“behind”	or	“beyond”	ontology’	but	is	embedded	or	‘implanted’	within	it.	To	begin	to	unpack	this	idea,	it	is	helpful	to	return	to	how	debates	about	feminist	turns	highlight	that	feminist	theory	is	interested	not	only	in	content,	but	also	in	how	turns	move	feminist	theory	in	particular	directions.	In	other	words,	feminist	theory	is	concerned	not	only	with	the	world	(empirical	or	textual,	past,	present	or	future)	that	is	somehow	‘out	there’,	but	also	with	itself,	with	the	movements	and	trajectories	of	feminist	theory.	In	Adkins’	terms,	feminism	is	therefore	‘shift[ing]	from	a	form	of	
political	consciousness	constituted	by	subjects	reflecting	on	socioempirical	objects	–	a	political	consciousness	constituted	by	an	external	reflexivity	–	to	a	self-consciousness	characterized	by	a	self	or	internal	reflexivity’	(2004:	433).		
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	Feminist	theory	might	therefore	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	surface	in	that	there	is	a	changing	relationship	between	feminist	theory,	knowledge	production,	and	the	empirical	(and/or	textual)	world.	The	shift	documented	by	Adkins	in	the	quotation	immediately	above,	indicates	that	feminism	operates	not	only	in	terms	of	a	relationship	between	epistemology	and	ontology,	where	feminist	theory	is	understood	as	epistemological,	and	the	socioempirical	as	ontological;	that	is,	feminist	theory	is	not	only	interested	in	‘socioempirical	objects’.	Instead,	feminist	theory	has	developed	a	relationship	with,	or	a	‘self-consciousness’	about,	itself,	so	that	feminist	theory	is	both	epistemological	and	ontological.	Moreover,	to	return	to	Adkins’	argument	discussed	further	above,	it	is	not	only	with	itself	that	feminist	theory	has	a	reflexive	relationship;	it	is	also	with	the	‘socioempirical’.	As	Adkins	argues,	‘rather	than	a	spectator,	feminism	is	implicated	in	and	is	co-determinous	with	the	rapid	transformations	of	cultural	and	social	life’	(2004:	441),	and	thus	‘a	distinction	between	self-reflexivity	and	the	social	is	difficult	to	maintain’	(2004:	434).	Feminist	theory	is	not	(only)	an	epistemology	–	a	way	of	knowing	the	world	–	but	is	also	ontological	in	its	imbrication	in	the	becoming	of	those	worlds.		
Possibility,	or	the	non-linear	trajectories	of	feminist	theory	In	order	to	develop	this	idea	of	the	reflexivity	of	the	surface,	it	is	helpful	to	remember	that	in	the	debates	about	the	movements	that	feminist	turns	indicate	or	generate,	the	‘new’	and	‘old’	or	‘past’	are	seen	as	particularly	problematic	or	generative.	For	critics	of	particular	turns,	‘the	new’	serves	to	cast	other	issues,	positions	and	politics	as	past,	over	or	‘already	dealt	with’	(Hemmings	2005:	561).	At	the	same	time,	and	often	in	direct	engagement	with	these	debates	about	turns,	a	range	of	perspectives	have	sought	to	show	how	a	linear	model	of	temporality	is	inappropriate	in	understanding	the	trajectory	of	feminist	theory.	In	my	reading	of	these	perspectives,	feminist	theory	does	not	
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progress	smoothly,	and	is	capable	of	neither	returning	to	or	moving	on	from/beyond	an	agreed	upon	past.	It	cannot	be	reproduced	or	passed	on	across	or	between	generations	as	if	either	these	generations	or	feminism	itself	are	stable	entities.	Indeed,	responding	to	similar	arguments	that	Adkins	identifies	about	the	‘passing	away’	of	feminism,	Beverley	Skeggs	(2008)	refuses	the	‘story	of	“failed	reproduction”’	and	instead	posits	feminist	theory	in	terms	of	a	‘dirty	history’	(2008:	684).	Feminist	theory	is	not	linear	but	rather	is	a	story	of	‘extraordinary	replication’	(2008:	684);	‘of	de-	and	re-inscription,	of	de-	and	re-territorialisation,	of	a	struggle	over	the	politics	of	knowledge’	(2008:	684).	In	a	different	mode,	but	engaging	with	many	similar	issues,	Iris	van	der	Tuin	has	carefully	analysed	a	generational	logic	within	feminist	theory,	and	developed	a	notion	of	a	‘generational	feminism’	where	change	within	and	between	feminist	theories	(for	example	between	second	and	third	waves)	is	understood	in	a	non-conflictual,	non-dialectical,	non-linear	way;	as	generative,	replicating	and/or	jumping	(2009,	2015).			Feminist	theory	may	therefore	be	understood	in	terms	of	‘reflexivity’	not	only	in	its	self-consciousness	and	relationship	with	the	social,	but	also	in	terms	of	its	non-linear	trajectories	and	movements.	This	is	important	in	terms	of	the	‘reflexive’,	‘non-linear	and	non-Euclidean’	logic	(2009:	16)	that	Adkins	and	Lury	suggest	characterises	the	surface.	Indeed,	one	of	the	ways	Adkins	and	Lury	see	the	reconfiguration	of	the	relationship	between	epistemology	and	ontology	is	that,	through	the	‘implantation’	of	‘co-ordinating	axes	or	categories	of	knowing’	into	or	onto	the	surface,	‘a	space	of	possible	states’	is	produced	(2009:	18).	Put	another	way,	the	relationship	between	epistemology	and	ontology	is	collapsed	or	blurred	so	that	rather	than	being	external	to	that	which	it	seeks	to	understand	and	create	knowledge	about,	epistemology	is	‘implanted’	into	ontology.	Ontology	and	epistemology	are	on	and	of	the	same	surface.	Adkins	and	Lury	describe	this	surface	as	a	‘topological	space	of	all	the	possible	states	that	a	system	can	have’	(2009:	16).	Topology	here	refers	both	to	the	capacity	of	a	surface	to	‘contain’	or	induce	
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‘all	the	possible	states	that	a	system	can	have’,	and,	in	Mike	Michael	and	Marsha	Rosengarten’s	terms,	how	a	surface	enables	an	‘attempt	to	capture	heterogeneous	relations	and	exchanges.	Things	that	are	seemingly	distant	[…]	turn	out	to	be	far	more	promiscuous	and	can	be	shown	to	be	in	far	closer	proximity	than	one	might	initially	imagine’	(2012:	104).			A	surface	is	therefore	a	site	composed	through	and	on	which	multiple	and	potentially	diverse	entities	or	states	may	(be)	assemble(d).	In	the	case	of	feminist	theoretical	turns,	a	surface	might	be	a	site	on	which	(various	possible	versions	of)	the	past,	present	and	future	assemble	and	are	arranged.	An	understanding	of	feminist	theoretical	turns	in	terms	of	the	surface	may	therefore	be	a	means	to	take	seriously	proponents	and	opponents	of	a	particular	turn.	That	is,	through	a	surfacing	of	feminist	theoretical	turns,	debates	and	struggles	about	the	‘possible	states’	of	feminist	theory	are	or	can	be	assembled	together	within	or	on	one	surface.	It	may	also	be	a	means	of	thinking	about	the	‘new’,	‘old’,	past,	present	and	future	as	non-linear,	multidirectional	temporalities.	That	is,	if	the	surface	is	a	‘promiscuous’	site	where	not	only	‘heterogeneous’	but	also	‘seemingly	distant’	things	might	be	‘in	far	closer	proximity	than	one	might	imagine’,	it	follows	that	what	might	be	designated	as	far	apart	in	linear	models	of	time	might	be	contiguous.	Conceived	as	such,	a	feminist	theoretical	turn	might	not	so	much	be	a	movement	away	from	some	issues	and	towards	others,	but	a	surface	on	which	different	possible	temporalities	exist	at	the	same	time,	and	are	(made)	proximate	–	or	not.		
Lines,	or	accounting	for	the	non-linear	trajectories	of	feminist	theory	In	conceiving	feminist	theoretical	turns	in	terms	of	the	surface,	a	number	of	questions	are	raised,	including	which	debates	and	struggles	are	particularly	intense	within	a	turn,	which	versions	of	feminist	pasts,	presents	and	futures	become	dominant,	and	how	potentially	divergent	positions	and	arguments	are	coordinated	or	arranged.	In	seeing	a	
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turn	as	a	surface	that	contains	and/or	provokes	‘all	the	possible	states’	of	the	system	of	feminist	theory,	a	theoretical	turn	can	be	understood	as	a	surface	on	which	different	
lines	of	argumentation	become	assembled10.		To	take	one	example	of	an	analysis	of	and	intervention	in	a	feminist	theoretical	turn,	in	an	article	titled	‘The	(f)utility	of	a	feminist	turn	to	Foucault’,	Moya	Lloyd	(1993)	points	out	that	some	feminist	theorists	argue	that	‘Foucauldian	genealogy	cannot	illuminate	systematically	unequal	power	relations’	(1993:	435).	Through	her	careful	analysis	of	both	proponents	and	opponents	of	a	feminist	Foucauldian	turn,	Lloyd	notes	that	‘power	is	a	contested	concept	within	feminism’	and	‘that	the	relation	of	the	subject	to	power	is	problematized	by	any	proposed	recourse	to	Foucault’	(1993:	441);	an	issue	that	is	seen	as	‘most	pressing’	for	‘theorising	patriarchy’	(1993:	442).	Lloyd	agrees	with	feminist	critics	that	Foucault	does	not	explicitly	consider	sexed	and	gendered	power,	but	mobilises	Foucault’s	conception	of	bio-power	to	offer	an	understanding	of	‘patriarchy	as	a	particular	historical	configuration	of	power	relations,	without	common	origin’	(1993:	444)	and,	in	the	process,	‘to	challenge,	or	indeed	provoke,	[…]	a	serious	reflection	upon,	and	potential	rethinking	of,	the	meaning	of	“patriarchy”’	(1993:	445).			Lloyd’s	analysis	and	argument	demonstrate	how	lines	of	argumentation	concerned	with	what	might	be	termed	the	‘old’	or	‘already	dealt	with’	(Hemmings	2005:	561)	exist	within	the	feminist	turn	to	Foucault	at	the	same	time	as	lines	concerned	with	what	might	be	termed	‘the	new’.	That	is,	lines	of	argumentation	that	are	focused	on	how	patriarchy	locates	women	in	unequal	power	relations	are,	for	Lloyd,	at	stake	in	any	feminist	Foucauldian	turn	at	the	same	time	as	lines	of	argumentation	that	seek	to	‘challenge,	or	indeed	provoke’	a	thinking	through	of	what	patriarchy,	as	a	category,	means.	Indeed,	Lloyd	remarks	that,	‘while	admittedly	disruptive	of	certain	feminist	ways	of	theorizing’,	a	turn	to	Foucault	‘could	also	be	positive	to	feminism’,	and	‘intensely	
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provocative	and	potentially	productive’	(1993:	457).	Here,	Lloyd	takes	up	a	position	that	might	be	characterized	as	on	the	side	of	‘the	new’,	in	that	she	argues	for	a	rethinking	of	patriarchy	(‘old’)	through	Foucault’s	concept	of	biopower	(‘new’).	However,	this	rethinking	might	be	understood	not	so	much	as	a	turning	away	from	patriarchy	but,	as	I	discuss	below,	a	turning	over	of	it.	The	point	here	is,	understood	in	terms	of	a	surface,	in	this	particular	discussion	of	the	feminist	turn	to	Foucault,	multiple	lines	of	argumentation	(past,	present,	‘old’,	‘new’)	exist	at	the	same	time,	and	things	that	might	be	cast	as	over	according	to	a	linear	model	of	time	(such	as	patriarchy),	are	(brought)	proximate	(to)	things	that	are	‘new’	(biopower).			
Knots,	or	the	tying	together	of	non-linear	trajectories	of	feminist	theory,	and	
accounting	for	what	of	a	theoretical	turn	is	seen	as	particularly	important	While	lines	indicate	how	diverse	arguments	may	exist	at	the	same	time	on	a	surface,	they	might	also	be	a	helpful	conceptual	device	to	examine	how	some	lines	of	argument	become	knotted,	perhaps	around	a	particular	problem.	After	all,	in	debates	about	a	turn,	lines	of	argumentation	not	only	exist	at	the	same	time,	but	get	tied	together	in	particular	ways.	Sophie	Day,	Celia	Lury	and	Nina	Wakeford	describe	knots	as	capable	of	‘hold[ing]	together	all	kinds	of	reciprocal	relationships	and	stories’	(2014:	142)	and	as	‘involv[ing]	some	kind	of	looping	by	which	fastening	is	achieved	within	movement’	(2014:	141).11	Knots	here	then,	can	refer	to	a	tethering	together,	in	a	more	or	less	secure	way,	of	multi-directional,	changing	and	diverse	feminist	trajectories	in	or	around	a	particular	turn.	At	the	same	time,	and	perhaps	(although	not	always),	how	lines	get	tied	together	indicates	a	particularly	significant	issue;	or	what	might	also	be	referred	to	as	a	‘knotty	problem’.	In	the	above	example,	Lloyd’s	concern	with	patriarchy	might	be	seen	in	this	way.		The	first	sense	of	the	knot	seeks	to	account	for	how	a	turn	signals	a	particular	movement	of	feminist	theory.	While	I	have	suggested	that,	understood	in	terms	of	a	
	 20	
surface,	such	movements	and	alterations	in	direction	are	capable	of	existing	at	the	same	time	‘within’	a	particular	site	(i.e.	that	which	may	be	cast	as	past	according	to	a	linear	model	of	time	exists	as	a	‘possible	state’	according	to	the	non-linearity	of	the	surface),	it	is	nevertheless	important	to	consider	how	debates	about	turns	are	debates	about	the	orientations	and	directions	of	feminist	theory;	they	are	struggles	over	what	lines	of	argumentation	are	carried	through,	and	what	seem	of	less	significance.	While	an	understanding	of	turns	through	a	linear	model	of	time	might	see	movements	within	feminist	theory	as	evolution	or	forgetting,	in	terms	of	the	non-linear	understanding	of	the	temporalities	of	turns	I	am	developing	here,	a	turn	indicates	a	twisting,	twirling	or	looping	of	potentially	diverse	lines	of	argumentation.			In	debates	about	the	affective	turn,	for	example,	there	is	struggle	about	how	lines	of	argumentation	developed	in	specific	disciplinary	contexts	are	tied	together;	these	are	important	in	bringing	to	attention	the	specificities	of	particular	lines	of	argumentation,	as	well	as	to	a	thinking	through	of	whether	and	how	it	is	possible	to	secure	and	stablise	(even	if	only	temporarily)	potentially	diverse	lines	of	argumentation	in	the	service	of	another	argument	–	and	in	the	service	of	a	feminist	politics.	For	instance,	Ruth	Leys	argues	that	some	cultural	theories	take	up	‘a	false	picture	of	how	the	mind	relates	to	the	body’	(2011:	456-7)	that	is	apparent	in	some	scientific	work	on	affect,	contributing	to	what	she	sees	as	misreadings	of	science	in	cultural	theory.	Her	position	would	seem	to	suggest	that	lines	of	argumentation	developed	in	science	need	to	be	separated	from,	or	at	the	very	least	taken	up	with	great	caution	in,	cultural	theory.	In	her	work	on	empathy	as	transnational	affective	relations,	Carolyn	Pedwell	argues	that	‘when	translated	through	the	lens	of	critical	theory,	neuroscientific	perspectives	can	add	a	productive	element	[…]	to	our	understanding	of	empathetic	engagement	and	related	networks	of	feeling’	(2014:	5).	To	understand	the	complex	ways	empathy	operates	as	affective	relations,	a	range	of	approaches	are	required.	For	Leys	and	Pedwell,	then,	how	lines	of	
	 21	
argumentation	developed	in	science	and	cultural	theory	should	be	taken	up	and	tied	together	differ;	debate	over	the	content	and	direction	of	theoretical	turns	highlights	whether	and	how	lines	of	argumentation	become	knotted.	In	suggesting	the	surfacing	of	feminist	turns	then,	I	am	not	proposing	to	flatten	out	debate;	surfaces	are	textured	and	patterned	(Hughes	and	Lury	2013),	they	percolate	and	involve	rifts	(Michael	and	Rosengarten	2012)	–	they	are	knotty.			Knots	are	also	helpful	in	terms	of	thinking	about	what	is	struggled	over	in	debates	about	theoretical	turns.	I	have	already	indicated	how	the	‘new’	and	‘old’	emerge	as	particularly	evident	in	these	debates,	and	how	feminist	theory	moves	and	develops	in	non-linear	ways.	In	her	analysis	of	the	stories	that	are	told	of	feminist	theory,	for	example,	Hemmings	notes	the	significance	of	a	‘return’	narrative,	which	‘affirm[s]	a	common	present	by	affirm[ing]	a	shared	past’	(2011:	98).	However,	it	is	also	possible	to	think	of	a	theoretical	turn	as	a	return	in	another	way.	In	their	article	that	proposes	a	feminist	ecological	epistemology,	Christina	Hughes	and	Celia	Lury	(2013)	argue	for	a	return	to	the	concept	of	situated	knowledge,	developed	by	Donna	Haraway	(1988)	among	others	in	the	1980s,	as	a	means	of	‘articulating	the	dynamic	intra-actions	between	human	and	non-human	forces’	(2013:	786).	They	explain	a	return	to	situated	knowledge	not	so	much	as	a	going	back	to	the	1980s,	nor	an	attempt	to	synthesise	different	lines	of	argumentation:		 Rather	than	the	currently	ubiquitous	narratives	of	‘turns’	with	their	endless	twists,	ruptures	and	sudden	encounters,	such	returns	are	products	of	repetition,	of	coming	back	to	persistent	troublings;	they	are	turnings	over.	In	such	re-turnings,	there	is	no	singular	or	unified	progressive	history	or	approach	to	discover.	Rather,	there	is	the	intensity	of	multi-dimensional	trajectories,	as	concepts	are	de-	and	re-contextualised	(2013:	787).		
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	As	with	the	feminist	theories	discussed	above,	Hughes	and	Lury	trouble	an	understanding	of	feminist	theory	as	linear,	and	instead	point	to	how	it	is	characterized	by	and	constituted	through	‘multi-dimensional	trajectories’	and	‘repetition’.	Returns	are	a	‘coming	back	to	persistent	troublings’,	a	‘de-	and	re-contextualis[ation]’	of	concepts	so	that	important	and	difficult	problems	can	be	‘turned	over’.	What	the	concern	with	the	‘new’	and	‘old’	of	feminist	theory	indicates,	then,	is	a	concern	over	what	is	seen	as	a	‘persistent	troubling’,	and	what	is	being	‘turned	over’.	The	notion	of	return	that	Hughes	and	Lury	propose,	then,	draws	through	the	notion	of	knots	that	I	have	suggested:	a	twisting	or	twirling;	a	returning	to	and	of	a	problem.12			It	also	suggests	the	tying	together	of	different	lines	of	argumentation	around	a	particularly	knotty	problem.	In	the	example	above	of	Lloyd’s	article,	both	feminist	theory	as	it	has	been	concerned	with	social	reality	and	feminist	Foucauldian	theory	twist	around	the	‘persistent	problem’	of	power	and	gender	inequality.	This	problem	acts	as	a	nub	around	which	‘old’	and	‘new’	concepts	–	patriarchy	and	bio-power	–	are	brought	to	bear.	While	this	example	focuses	on	an	argument	advocating	for	a	turn,	an	analysis	of	critical	accounts	of	a	feminist	turn	may	also	demonstrate	this	point.	For	example,	in	Ahmed’s	critique	of	the	new	materialism,	it	may	be	that	materialism	is	a	persistent	problem	that	is	returned	to	and	turned	over	through	different	lines	of	argumentation;	in	Ahmed’s	case	by	a	return	to	‘older’	feminist	theories	of	biology,	science	and	matter,	and	in	new	materialist	feminist	theories	by	‘newer’	theories	of	this	issue.	Understood	in	terms	of	a	surfacing	of	a	turn,	the	‘old’	and	‘new’,	supportive	and	critical,	are	brought	into	proximity	in	a	knot	around	an	–	unfortunately	–	enduring	problem.		
Diagrams,	or	accounting	for	the	coordination	of	a	surface	
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In	their	explanation	of	the	surface,	Adkins	and	Lury	note	the	significance	of	a	concern	with	its	arrangement	or	organisation,	suggesting	that	the	‘possible	states’	of	a	surface	are	not	only	produced	but	also	coordinated	in	and	through	its	processual	nature	and	its	reformulation	of	the	relationship	between	epistemology	and	ontology	(2009:	18).	The	notions	of	lines	and	knots	highlight	the	non-linearity	of	the	surface	in	how	different	lines	of	argumentation	become	tied	in	knots	around	particular	knotty	problems.	In	this	way,	knots	indicate	nubs,	hubs	or	hot	spots	on	a	surface,	and	so	draw	attention	to	the	texture	and	patterning	of	a	surface	–	or	to	what	might	also	be	understood	as	how	a	surface	is	arranged	and	coordinated.	Accounting	for	the	arrangement	and	coordination	of	a	surface	is	crucial	in	order	to	map	which	problems	become	knots/knotty,	which	concepts	become	drawn	into	proximity	around	them,	which	lines	of	argumentation	are	drawn	through,	and	which	fade	or	are	dropped.	That	is,	an	account	of	the	arrangement	and	coordination	of	a	surface	is	to	take	seriously	debates	about	a	turn	and	to	map	the	power	relations	of	that	surface/surfacing.			For	example,	to	revisit	Lloyd’s	1993	article	about	the	productiveness	of	a	Foucauldian	turn	for	feminist	theory,	in	2015	it	may	indeed	seem	that	the	concept	of	bio-power	became	particularly	helpful	in	understanding	gendered	inequality	and	power	relations,	and,	with	the	cultural	turn	and	the	new	materialist	turn,	that	the	concept	of	patriarchy,	with	its	roots	in	a	materialism	based	in	and	on	social	reality,	became	less	helpful.	Mapping	the	surface	of	a	turn	can	therefore	tell	a	chronological	history	of	the	development	of	feminist	theory	–	which	theories	and	concepts	become	important	when,	and	with	what	effects	on	other	theories	and	concepts?	In	this	sense,	mapping	is	a	project	of	tracking	or	tracing	lines,	and	their	coagulation	into	knots.	However,	mapping	may	have	a	more	dynamic	sense.	Nanna	Verhoeff,	for	example,	has	designated	a	performative	cartography	–	creative,	evolving	and	emergent	through	movement	(2012:	145),	where	‘time	and	space	unfold	in	practices	and	consequently	do	not	work	along	predetermined	
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lines’	(2012:	146).	Verhoeff’s	understanding	of	mapping	is	also	echoed	in	Joe	Gerlach’s	(2014)	concept	of	‘vernacular	mapping’,	which	seeks	to	account	for	‘the	nearly-there	materialities	of	cartography;	the	non-representational	coordinates	of	maps;	affect	and	the	virtual’	(2014:	23).			The	concept	of	the	diagram	is	one	means	through	which	this	mapping	might	be	achieved.	Indeed,	in	explaining	Deleuze’s	conception	of	the	diagram	and	its	relation	with	mapping,	Jakub	Zdebik	argues	that	while	‘tracing’	or	‘tracking’	movement	is	one	of	the	necessary	functions	of	the	diagram,	it	is	not	its	only	one:		 Tracing,	although	necessary,	cannot	offer	anything	new	to	thought	because	its	function	is	to	copy	and	represent	what	is	already	there.	The	map	on	the	other	hand	–	and	here	the	map	is	taken	away	from	the	classical	model,	but	without	losing	the	classical	spirit	that	induced	it	–	is	an	exploration	device,	something	that	does	not	imitate	but	that	constantly	explores	the	unknown	(Zdebik	2014:	34).		Mapping	–	or	diagramming	–	is	in	this	sense	active;	transformational,	emergent,	creative.	As	an	‘exploration	device’,	diagrams	are	a	means	of	mapping	not	only	what	is,	but	also	what	might	be:	the	‘possible	states’	that	might	exist	on/as	a	surface.	In	terms	of	the	surfacing	of	feminist	theoretical	turns,	this	might	be	to	make	connections	between	different	lines	of	argumentation,	and	to	bring	into	proximity	concepts	that	might	otherwise	be	placed	at	mutually	exclusive	positions	on	a	linear	timeline.	According	to	the	suggestion	about	surfacing	feminist	theoretical	turns	that	I	have	made,	mapping	the	surface	of	a	turn	may	also	enable	an	understanding	and	analysis	of	the	non-linear	temporalities	of	feminist	theory.	For	example,	a	returning	of	debates	about	the	Foucauldian	turn	in	feminist	theory	might	diagram	the	‘old’	issue	of	patriarchy	as	
	 25	
important,	and	hence,	as	I’ve	suggested,	might	bring	patriarchy	into	proximity	with	the	‘new’	concept	of	bio-power.	The	surface	of	the	Foucauldian	turn	is	mapped	not	only	linearly	and/or	chronologically,	but	is	also	coordinated	non-linearly	through	lines	and	knots.			Further,	Adkins	and	Lury	point	to	the	diagram	as	a	non-representational	sign	where	calculation	and	indexation	are	‘no	longer	determined	by	an	external	“set”	[…]	but	by	a	process	of	deformation	and	modification	of	diagrams	themselves’	(2009:	17).	Of	significance	here	is	the	capacity	of	diagrams	to	be	self-determining,	so	that	epistemology	is	not	external	to	the	diagram	but	that	the	diagram	is	able	to	modify	itself.	Co-ordination	of	a	surface	is	not	external	but	reflexive	and	within	or	immanent	to	the	surface.	Taking	up	this	immanence	and	reflexivity	of	a	diagram,	those	within	a	debate	about	a	feminist	turn	are	at	once	inducing	the	turn	and	laying	out	their	coordinates	of	and	for	it.	The	flexibility	of	the	diagram	as	a	mapping	device	suggests	that	the	contours,	lines,	knots	and	‘possible	states’	of	a	surface	will	differ,	or	be	specific	to	the	particular	position(s),	tradition(s)	and	trajectory/ies	a	feminist	theory	is	‘in’.	Importantly,	this	is	not	to	see	a	feminist	theorist	as	in	an	external	(or	unreflexive)	position	to	the	theoretical	turn	–	nor	indeed,	to	necessarily	prioritise	the	human	subject13.	As	Hughes	and	Lury	note,	in	their	
return	to	situated	knowledge,	‘situatedness’	is	understood	‘not	as	a	position	or	an	identity,	but	as	emergent	in	the	diverse	processes	of	differentiation,	the	patterns	of	movement,	that	constitute	the	moving	surface	or	ground	of	figures	of	knowledge’	(2013:	792).	Feminist	theorists	–	and	the	human	and	non-human	materials	that	help	to	create	her	theories	–	are	embedded	within	the	‘moving	surface’	of	a	turn.	As	an	‘exploration	device’,	the	diagram	is	thus	capable	of	mapping	out	the	coordination	of	the	surface	of	a	theoretical	turn	in	various,	situated	ways,	highlighting	non-linear	temporalities	and	connectivities,	and	performing	and	transforming	feminist	theory	in	the	process.		
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Surfacing	feminist	theoretical	turns:	Concluding	comments	As	this	paper	takes	up	and	is	involved	in	what	is	called	a	‘turn	to	the	surface’,	I	want	to	recognize	that	this	turn,	and	the	indicative	suggestions	made	here,	may	themselves	generate	their	own	debate.	That	is,	it	is	important	to	note	that	I	am	in	some	senses	proposing	a	(further)	turn	in,	to	and	for	feminist	theory	–	one	that	attempts	to	attend	to	the	salience	of	and	debates	around	turns	themselves.	However,	I	also	want	to	point	out	that	a	turn	to	the	surface	is	not	an	attempt	to	settle	ongoing	debates	about	epistemology	and	ontology,	(non-)linear	temporalities	and	spatialities,	or	persistent	troublings.	Rather,	in	Hughes	and	Lury’s	terms,	the	turn	to	the	surface	may	be	turnings-over	of	these	issues;	returns	to	debates	about	them.		More	particularly,	in	suggesting	that	feminist	theoretical	turns	be	understood	in	terms	of	(a	turn	to)	the	surface,	it	is	important	to	note	that	I	am	not	arguing	that	the	surface	is	a	means	to	resolve	the	debates	and	struggles	about	feminist	theoretical	turns;	such	a	task	would	be	misguided	in	ignoring	how	there	are	feminisms	rather	than	feminism,	and	how,	as	I’ve	discussed,	debate	and	struggle	are	integral	to	feminism,	and	indeed	any	political	and	ethical	movement.	Nor	am	I	proposing	the	surface	as	a	means	of	necessarily	ensuring	greater	inclusion	with/in	feminist	theory.	One	aspect	of	my	argument	is	that	a	surface	is	capable	of	incorporating	multiple	and	potentially	diverse	theories	–	it	is	a	site	of	‘possible	states’	–	and	in	this	way	it	is	a	means	of	accounting	for	positions	that	critics	of	particular	turns	argue	are	excluded.	However,	at	the	same	time,	I	am	mindful	of	the	potential	for	inclusion	to	collapse	into	what,	in	their	analysis	of	key	feminist	articles	and	special	issues	on	intersectionality,	Maria	Carbin	and	Sara	Edenheim	point	out	is	an	erasure	of	power	relations.	Carbin	and	Edenheim	propose	that	their	analysis	shows	that	the	‘intersectional	turn’	in	feminist	theory	is	characterized	by	a	lack	of	debate.	They	argue	that	‘there	is	no	such	contestation	[about	intersectionality]	going	on,	it	is	only	stated	that	there	are	conflicts,	but	without	any	references	to	such	debates’	(2013:	239-
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240).	For	these	authors,	this	lack	of	debate,	as	well	as	a	more	general	‘theoretical	vagueness’,	has	led	intersectionality	theory	to	be	a	‘consensus-creating	signifier	that	not	only	made	the	concept	[of	intersectionality]	successful	but	also	enabled	an	institutionalization	of	a	liberal	“all-inclusive”	feminism	based	on	a	denial	of	power	as	constitutive	for	all	subjects	(and	non-subjects	alike)’	(2013:	234)14.	In	introducing	a	‘turn	to	the	surface’,	I	am	suggesting	it	neither	as	a	turn	that	necessarily	solves	the	problem	of	exclusion,	nor	presenting	it	as,	in	Carbin	and	Edenheim’s	terms,	‘the	feminist	theory’	(2013:	245)	where	‘“everyone”	feels	that	it	fits	“their	way	of	doing	research”’	(2013:	245).			In	suggesting	the	surface	as	a	means	to	understand	the	temporalities	of	feminist	theory,	what	I	am	indicating	is	that	as	a	‘space	[and	time]	of	possible	states’,	nothing	is	necessarily	precluded	on,	in,	or	for	a	surface.	However,	it	is	also	to	map	–	diagrammatically	–	the	lines	and	knots	of	these	possible	states	in	order	to	attend	to	the	power	relations	of	a	surface.	This	is	to	take	seriously	lines	of	argumentation	that	both	propose	and	oppose	a	particular	turn.	In	terms	of	the	issue	of	the	‘new’	and	‘old’,	this	is	to	attend	to	what	is	(most	strongly	put)	both	attractive	and	repellant	about	a	turn.	It	is	to	take	up	feminist	arguments	about	the	non-linear	temporalities	of	feminist	theories	and	to	consider	how	theoretical	turns	seem	to	highlight	such	non-linearity	especially.	To	paraphrase	–	or	return	–	some	of	the	questions	posed	by	Roof	(cited	in	Adkins	(2004:	431),	it	is	to	engage	with	the	‘multidirectional’	temporalities	of	feminist	theory,	and	to	see	debates	about	feminist	turns	as	involving	not	so	much	progress	or	loss,	but	‘repetition,	alternation,	oscillation’.			
Acknowledgements	
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Notes	
1	This	article	extends	a	short	paper	presented	at	‘Orienting	feminism(s):	Feminist	“turns”	and	the	political	economy	of	knowledge	production’,	the	Centre	for	the	Study	of	Women	and	Gender,	University	of	Warwick,	28th	February	2014.	I	wish	to	acknowledge	and	thank	the	organisers,	Maria	do	Mar	Pereira	and	Kathryn	Medien,	as	well	as	those	who	attended	and	submitted	questions,	for	providing	the	inspiration	for	this	longer	article	(which	may	well	propose	an	understanding	of	turns	different	to	their	own).	
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																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													2	For	overviews	of	the	affective	turn,	see	for	example	Seigworth	and	Gregg	2010,	and	of	the	new	materialist	turn,	van	der	Tuin	and	Dolphijn	2012.	
3	For	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	the	new	materialism	as	a	turn	in	feminist	theory,	see	Coleman	(2014).	
4	See	Witz	(2000)	for	a	slightly	different	account	of	how	the	body	is	conceptualized	in	feminist	sociology	and	sociology	in	the	‘corporeal	turn’.	
5	Notable	here	is	that	while	Canning	and	Mascia-Lees	et	al	are	keen	to	assert	the	importance	of	feminist	theorizing	to	a	turn	that	is	happening	in	their	broader	disciplines	(i.e.	they	are	not	necessarily	concerned	with	feminism	per	se),	Ahmed’s	argument	is	addressed	to	feminist	theorists,	who	she	sees	as	overlooking	previous	feminist	work.	It	is	also	notable	that	while	Canning	and	Mascia-Lees	et	al’s	arguments	reassert	the	significance	of	feminist	theory	to	turns	in	their	own	disciplines,	many	of	the	critiques	of	the	affective	and	new	materialist	turns	imply	an	unease	with	interdisciplinarity,	as	noted	above.	
6	Here,	then,	is	a	link	to	Hemmings’	critique	of	the	affective	turn	for	its	encouragement	of	an	‘affirmative’	frame	of	mind;	see	above.	
7	On	surfaces,	see	also	Ingold	(2007,	2010),	Amato	(2013)	and	Coleman	and	Oakley-Brown	(in	preparation).	
8	While	Adkins	and	Lury	describe	the	surface	as	spatial	here,	it	is	also	a	temporal	site,	as	I	go	on	to	discuss.		
9	Definitions	taken	from	the	Microsoft	Word	dictionary,	12th	August	2015.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	a	further	definition	is	‘on	the	turn’;	‘on	the	point	of	going	sour’	–	a	definition	which	may	be	appropriate	to	the	points	made	in	some	of	the	debates	about	theoretical	turns!	
10	For	other	accounts	of	the	relationship	between	lines	and	the	surface,	see	Ingold	(2007)	and	Coleman	(in	preparation).		
11	Here,	they	are	drawing	on	Katie	King’s	(2012)	analysis	of	khipu	knots.	
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																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													12	Indeed,	it	is	important	to	note	that	Hughes	and	Lury	propose	the	knot	as	one	term	that	is	‘designed	to	illustrate	potential	practices	for	developing	situated	knowledges’	(2013:	786).		
13	See	for	example	Barad	(2007)	on	the	significance	of	‘cuts’	within	positionality	and	boundary-making	practices;	for	further	discussions	of	this,	see	for	example,	Hughes	and	Lury	(2013),	Coleman	(2014).	
14	Carbin	and	Edenheim’s	investigation	demonstrates	that	such	a	situation	is	not	so	much	the	result	of	individual,	or	collectives	of,	feminist	theorists	but	rather	a	consequence	of	the	turn	itself.	That	is,	it	is	the	intersectional	turn	in	feminist	theory	that	‘has	created	a	consensus	that	conceals	fruitful	and	necessary	conflicts	within	feminism’	(2013:	233).		
